Economists may warn that the combination of Trump’s protectionism, big tax cuts, and uncontrolled government borrowing, coming at a time when the US economy is already near full employment, will ultimately fuel inflationary pressure. But financial markets simply do not believe this message.
經濟學家警告川普的保護主義、大減稅與政府債台高築在美國經濟已接近完全就業的情形下一同出現，終將徹底引爆通膨壓力。但市場對此訊息猶如鴨子聽雷。來源：Anatole Kaletsky, 27 MAR 2018, 原文網址
As US President Donald Trump ratchets up his trade war with China and the Federal Reserve Board increases US interest rates, the prospects for the world economy and financial markets, so bright just a few months ago, appear to be darkening. Stock markets around the world have fallen back toward their February lows, business confidence has weakened in Europe and much of Asia, and policymakers worldwide are making nervous noises. Are these events the beginning of the end of the global economic expansion, or is the recent market turbulence just a false alarm?
美國總統川普磨刀霍霍進行與中國的貿易戰，且聯準會持續進行升息，讓本來幾個月前前景一片美好的世界財經市場蒙上大片陰影。世界的股票市場大多已跌向二月份的低點，在歐洲與大部分的亞洲地區企業信心指標也都弱化。世界各國的政要也對此普遍發表忐忑不安的憂心。這些事件是否是全球經貿擴張終結的開端呢？或者這些市場波動單純只是誤告警？
Last month, I highlighted three indicators – the oil price, long-term US interest rates, and the dollar’s exchange rate – suggesting that global conditions would remain benign. Economists may warn that the combination of Trump’s protectionism, big tax cuts, and uncontrolled government borrowing, coming at a time when the US economy is already near full employment, will ultimately fuel inflationary pressure. But financial markets simply do not believe this message. And since the financial turbulence of early February, the message from the biggest and most important financial market – for US government bonds – has become even more reassuring.
上個月，我指出了三個指標：油價、美國長債利率、美元匯率，這些在在都顯示世界的經濟發展仍維持正向。經濟學家警告川普的保護主義、大減稅與政府債台高築在美國經濟已接近完全就業的情形下一同出現，終將徹底引爆通膨壓力。但市場對此訊息猶如鴨子聽雷。雖然二月初有波市場大混亂。但最重要的財經指標：美國長債利率，可說是變得更像是顆定心丸。
Despite the Fed’s decision to raise short-term interest rates, and to signal more rate hikes than expected for 2019, interest rates on US ten-year bonds have fallen to levels well below their February peak. Thirty-year interest rates are now below their 2017 peak of around 3.25%. These interest-rate movements imply that bond investors are less worried today about inflation and economic overheating than they were before Trump’s tax cuts, protectionist measures, and the shift from budget consolidation to aggressive fiscal expansion.
即使聯準會決定提昇短債利率，並暗示2019年的升息次數將比預期更多。美國10年期公債利率仍落在二月份最高點之下不少。30年期的利率則在2017年的最高點之下，約在3.25%左右。這些利率變化暗示著債券投資人比起川普減稅、保護主義手段與財政擴張措施出現之前，現今對通膨與經濟過熱的憂慮反倒降低。
The fact that bond investors seem unworried about inflation or overheating does not mean that Trump’s protectionism and fiscal profligacy are harmless. Financial markets are sometimes catastrophically wrong, as they were before the 2007-08 financial crisis. But the US bond market is more than just an indicator of financial opinion. The long-term interest rates set in bond markets have so much impact on business conditions that changes in investors’ views can influence economic reality almost as much as vice versa.
事實上債券投資人對通膨與經濟過熱看來老神在在，但這不代表川普的保護主義手段與浪費錢的財政擴張是無害的。市場有時就是錯得很離譜，就像2007-08年金融海嘯前那時一樣。但美國公債市場並不只是一個金融意見的指標。美國長債利率在債市中對經濟狀況有著極為重大的影響，在投資者對它的觀點若有改變的話是能實際影響經濟現況的，反之亦然。
At present, investors’ views and economic reality are completely at odds. Long-term interest rates of around 3% come nowhere near pricing in the Fed’s inflation target of 2% plus the real economic growth of 2-3% that was likely to be achieved even before the Trump administration’s big fiscal stimulus. In fact, both economic analysis and decades of past experience suggest that long-term interest rates tend to fluctuate around the rate of nominal GDP growth. This rule of thumb implies 30-year rates in the 4-5% range. And if Trump’s efforts to boost economic growth toward 4% were taken seriously, long-term interest rates should logically rise to 6% or above.
如今，投資者的看法與經濟現況實有根本的矛盾。長債利率的3%與聯準會訂的2%通膨目標加上極有可能在川普政府的財政刺激方案執行前就達陣的2~3%經濟成長還相距甚遠。事實上，經濟分析與過去數十年來經驗都指出長債利率傾向於在名目GDP成長值的附近遊走。這個經驗法則暗示著目前的30年期公債利率應在4~5%的範圍間。如果認真的把川普要將經濟成長推上4%的努力當一回事的話，長債利率則理當跳至6%以上。
Sooner or later, the gap between bond yields and nominal GDP growth will presumably close. Either growth will weaken dramatically, as implied by bond-market expectations, or interest rates will rise dramatically, because bond-market expectations turn out to be completely wrong.
遲早債券殖利率與名目GDP成長值的差異可想而知會逐漸收斂。要不是如債券市場所想的成長率會戲劇性的下滑，或是債券市場的期待徹底錯誤—利率會戲劇性的陡升。
And yet neither of these things will necessarily happen in the next year or two. GDP growth is unlikely to weaken, given the big fiscal stimulus, very high business confidence, and strong growth in personal incomes resulting from rapid job growth.
未來的一兩年內這些事都還未必會發生。GDP成長在大規模的財政刺激、高企業經營信心水準與職缺增加帶來的強勁個人收入增長的情形下並沒有轉弱的跡象。
But what about bond yields? If the US economy continues growing as expected, is it not inevitable that long-term interest rates will surge to much higher levels, knocking the highly leveraged US, and ultimately the entire world economy, off its current path of strong and stable growth?
但債券殖利率呢？如果美國經濟持續如預期般成長，無疑的長債利率不是應該上升到更高水準，然後把目前高槓桿的美國、以至於整個世界經濟從目前強勁與穩定的成長軌道敲下來嗎？
This seems unlikely, at least in the year ahead, for several related reasons. First and foremost, the belief in a “new normal” of anemic growth and low inflation is deeply embedded among investors and central bankers. After spending the decade since the financial crisis obsessing about secular stagnation and falling prices, investors and Federal Reserve officials will require many months or even years of consistent and incontrovertible evidence of inflation and higher growth to be convinced that deflationary conditions have genuinely reversed.
這看起來也不太會發生，或至少眼下這年不會，這有幾個理由。首先也是最重要的，所謂的"新常態"：貧弱的成長與低通膨這信條深深的刻在投資者與各國央行心中。自從金融海嘯後糾結纏繞的長期成長停滯與價格下滑問題已經過了十年，投資者與聯準會官員會需要數月甚至數年的時間持續的有一致、無可辯駁的關於通貨膨脹與高速成長的證據，才敢相信通縮的情境已經真正反轉。
Even when investors accept the intellectual case for much higher bond yields, regulatory impositions on banks and pension funds, together with quantitative easing in Japan and Europe and other forms of financial repression, will ensure continuing demand for government bonds at prices far above any reasonable estimate of fundamental values.
即使當投資者接受現實 — 更高的債券殖利率，銀行的監管措施、退休金基金與日本、歐洲還在進行的量化寬鬆政策，還有其他形式的金融抑制措施這些等等也都會確保美國政府公債會持續有強勁的需求，即便價格遠高於基本加值的合理估算。
The distorted pricing cause by regulatory pressures is amplified by a kind of conditioned response among bond investors. As inflation and interest rates have fallen steadily over the past 30 years, bond investors have been consistently rewarded for treating every temporary uptick in interest rates as a buying opportunity. This experience has created a Pavlovian reflex to “buy on dips” that can be broken only by many months or perhaps even years of negative experience. This reflex has been strongly apparent in the past two months. Whenever stock markets have fallen sharply, as they did in early February and again after Trump announced his trade sanctions on China, the bond-buying instinct became irresistible, bond prices rallied, and the resulting reductions in long-term interest rates stabilized stock markets.
由於債券投資人在某些情況下的反應，導致已因金融監管機制壓力所導致的扭曲價格被更形放大。當通膨與利率在最近30年間穩定下滑，債券投資人一直把短暫的利率上揚當作是買入的機會而獲得收益。這樣的經驗已經產生了一個"價格跳水就快買"的條件反射。這條件反射若沒有長達數月或是數年的失敗經驗恐難以抹除。這個條件反射在過去兩個月間尤為明顯。無論何時股票市場發生驟跌，例如二月初時與川普宣佈對中國的貿易制裁手段時。"買債券"的本能反應變得無法抗拒，債券價格上升，然後由此導致的長債利率下滑進而穩定了股票市場。
At some point, the bond market’s Pavlovian behavior will stop, and long-term interest rates will move much higher. But until this happens, investors’ unshakable belief that low inflation is a permanent feature of economic reality will allow the US government to pursue increasingly inflationary policies. And the bizarrely low long-term interest rates set by complacent bond markets will provide a safety net for global financial markets – at least until complacency proves to be unsustainable.
直到某個時間點，債券市場的條件反射行為才會停止，到時長債利率會升的更高。但直到此事發生，投資者對低通膨是經濟市場常態的堅定不移信念會讓美國政府傾向推出讓通膨更高的政策。被自信滿滿的債券市場所定價的、莫名其妙的長債利率將會給全球股市提供一個安全降落傘 — 至少能撐到牛皮被吹破前為止。
註釋：
nowhere near: 還差的遠
rule of thumb: 經驗法則
sooner or later: 遲早的事
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