How could the most prosperous city of what is, by all accounts, Latin America’s most prosperous and law-abiding country explode in protests marred by riots and looting? And what do recent events teach us about citizen dissatisfaction and the potential for violence in modern societies?
這個位於可說是拉丁美洲最豐饒與奉公守法的國家裡最繁榮的城市怎會爆發這樣遍地騷亂與洗劫的抗議活動？而關於公民的不滿情緒與現代社會潛藏的暴力問題，最近的這些事件告訴了我們什麼？
來源：Andrés Velasco, Project Syndicate, 28 OCT 2019, 原文網址At least 19 dead and untold wounded. A half-dozen subway stations attacked with firebombs. Hundreds of supermarkets vandalized and looted. The downtown headquarters of the country’s largest power distributor in flames. A city of nearly seven million people paralyzed. After a state of emergency is declared, army units patrol the streets and enforce a curfew.
至少有19人死亡與無數人受傷。有半打捷運站遭燃燒彈攻擊。數百間超市遭到破壞與洗劫。市中心裡本國最大電力公司的總部陷入火海。一個將近有七百萬居民的大城市陷入癱瘓。在宣佈國家進入緊急狀態後，軍隊出動在街道上巡邏並實施宵禁。
How could Santiago, Chile – the most prosperous city in what is, by all accounts, Latin America’s most prosperous and law-abiding country – come to this? And what do recent events teach us about citizen dissatisfaction and the potential for violence in modern societies?
聖地牙哥這個位於智利 - 可說是拉丁美洲最豐饒與奉公守法的國家裡最繁榮的城市怎會走到這步田地？而關於公民的不滿情緒與現代社會潛藏的暴力問題，最近的這些事件告訴了我們什麼？
In fact, we cannot be certain. It all happened with dizzying speed. And a few days after the violence came the peaceful protests. Last Friday, 1.2 million people marched in downtown Santiago, in the largest street protest since those that helped remove General Augusto Pinochet from office 30 years ago.
事實上，我們無法確定。事情發展的速度讓人眼花。往往和平的示威遊行幾天內就會變得暴力。上週五，有120萬人走上聖地牙哥街頭，自從30年前讓獨裁者皮諾契特將軍下台的示威遊行以來，這次的規模是最大的。
The most common explanation is that a 3% increase in metro fares caused public indignation at rising prices and high inequality to boil over. That must be true: people with sufficient income who feel they are treated fairly do not loot and riot. But as an explanation on which to base policy changes, the standard account risks being simplistic.
對此事最為廣泛的解釋是：捷運票價調漲了3%導致大眾對於價格上漲與嚴重不平等的憤怒終於炸開了。就常理來看：收入足夠且認為社會大致公平的人不會去發動暴亂與洗劫。然而要用來解釋基本政策的變動，以一般的觀念來歸因恐怕是過於簡化了問題。
Take price increases. Yes, Chile has a history of inflation. And, yes, because it is more prosperous, Santiago is more expensive than most Latin American cities. Yet Chilean inflation in the 12 months to September was barely 2.1%, and the central bank has been cutting interest rates because inflation is below its target.
就物價上漲來看，是的，智利有過通膨的歷史。另外，沒錯，因為聖地牙哥相對更為富裕，與其他拉丁美洲的城市比起來它的確更為昂貴。然而智利到九月止最近12個月的通膨率僅僅只是2.1%。而中央銀行還因為通膨率不如預期還調降了利率。
Or take income inequality. Yes, for an upper-middle-income country, Chile is very unequal, with a Gini coefficient (most economists’ preferred measure of income disparity) at a high level of 46.6 in 2017 (100 represents absolute inequality). Yet according to the World Bank, the coefficient has fallen from an eye-popping 57.2 when Chile returned to democracy in 1990. The notion that rising income inequality is behind citizen discontent does not fit reality.
那或是看看收入不平等的情形。是的，對一個中高收入等級的國家，智利非常不平等，在2017年的資料，基尼係數（大多經濟學家會用來衡量收入差距的工具）高達了46.6（100代表完全不平等）。而根據世界銀行資料，這項數據其實是有改善的，原因是智利在1990年代剛回歸民主政體時，那時可是令人傻眼的57.2。所以要是把人民的不滿歸因於收入不平等的惡化並非事實。
To understand the causes of a social phenomenon, one always must ask: Why here? Why now? Neither inflation nor rising income inequality provides a satisfactory answer.
要了解社會現象的根因，人們總會問：為什麼是這裡？為什麼是現在？通膨與收入不平等的惡化都無法提供令人信服的答案。
Others claim that Chileans are simply fed up with the intrusion of markets and profit-seeking into every corner of daily life. Again, this hypothesis has an air of plausibility. Polls show widespread dissatisfaction with private companies that provide public services ranging from water and electricity to health insurance and pension-fund administration.
其他人主張智利人只不過是受夠了市場經濟、獲利導向的觸角深入到日常生活的每一個角落。不過，這假設看來似乎言之成理。民調顯示水電等公共服務、健康保險到退休基金管理這些都被私有企業包攬下來確實招致廣泛的不滿。
Yet those same surveys also show anger at the quality of state-provided services, whether in hospitals, clinics, or foster-care facilities. Over half of parents choose to send their children to privately-run voucher schools, even when it involves paying a fee, despite the availability of free state schools of comparable quality. And in 2017 a substantial plurality of Chileans voted for President Sebastián Piñera, a billionaire businessman and unabashed apologist for capitalism who ran on a platform of reigniting growth.
相同的調查還顯示對國營服務的憤怒，這包含醫療、衛生、幼托機構。儘管有品質相當的免費公立學校，超過半數以上家長就算要自掏腰包也選擇送他們的孩子進私立學校。2017年有絕對多數的智利人選擇塞巴斯蒂安皮涅拉當總統，他是一個億萬富商與毫不憂讒畏譏、執意貫徹資本主義、推動激進成長的人，。
So, what is it, then? Why are millions of Chileans still marching in protest, ten days after the violence erupted?
那個，所以又怎樣呢？為何上百萬智利人還是上街抗議，十天後竟爆發流血衝突？
For starters, Chile is not alone. In the last decade, places as diverse as Great Britain, Brazil, France, Hong Kong, and Ecuador have experienced similar episodes. Whatever the immediate local trigger, the scope, intensity, and often the violence of the ensuing protests seemed out of proportion with the initial cause. Rapid social change fuels tensions and contradictions in modern societies – even rich and successful ones – that seem to keep them barely a step or two from mayhem.
首先，智利並非特例。在最近十年，世界各地如英國、巴西、法國、香港與厄瓜多都經歷到類似的情境。無論各地的導火線是什麼，後續的影響範圍、激烈程度與後續抗爭的暴力事件都與原本的根因不成比例。在現代社會，快速的社會變遷加劇了人們彼此間的緊張與矛盾 - 即使是富裕與成功的社會也是如此 - 這導致現代社會看起來離墜入混亂失序境地僅僅只有一步之遙。
In Chile, an obvious suspect is monopoly abuses. While general price inflation in Chile is low, some prices that matter for family budgets are high and rising. Regulatory regimes designed to ensure investment in utilities, for example, have given companies excessive leeway to keep prices high. Likewise, Chile’s pharmacy chains have been found guilty of collusion and price gouging, as have toilet paper producers, chicken farmers, and long-haul bus companies.
在智利，一個明顯的罪魁禍首是壟斷問題。在智利一般物價的通膨偏低、然而部份攸關家計民生卻偏高且持續上漲。例如，要用來確保對公用事業有充裕投資的監管機制卻給了這些企業過多為所欲為的空間導致價格居高不下。同樣的，智利的連鎖藥局因聯合哄抬與欺瞞價格背叛有罪，類似情形還有衛生紙製造商、雞肉農還有長途公共汽車業者。
Here is the paradox. Collusion and price fixing did not begin yesterday in Chile. But until a decade ago, sanctions were weak and the agency in charge had little authority and few resources to investigate. When the law changed, scandals began erupting every few months, raising public awareness of, and indignation with, monopolistic behavior. Today, price fixing is a criminal offense that carries jail sentences, and it seems plausible that such behavior is receding. But that very progress may have helped plant the seeds of public anger.
此有一弔詭之處。聯合哄抬與欺瞞價格在智利又不是昨天才發生的。但是十年前那時候，此情形的制裁軟弱無力，主管機關的公權力不彰、要發動調查所需的資源又不足。然而當法律修改，這種醜聞幾乎每幾個月就爆發一次，提高了大眾對這種壟斷行為的認識與憤慨。今日，價格欺瞞已是刑事罪名，要坐牢的。這種情況的減少應是理所當然的。但是這種情形的轉變倒成為了激化民眾憤怒的因子。
Turn next to the labor market. Chile’s unemployment rate hovers around 7% and wages have been rising well ahead of inflation. The bad news comes when you look at the structure of employment. Nearly one-third of the labor force is either self-employed or works in domestic service, in many cases without a formal contract and benefits. Among those who have a formal job, most work on short-term contracts. Employment rates for women and young people are among the lowest in the OECD. Discrimination is rampant. Hundreds of thousands of women who head households do not have a job, while millions of workers who have a job today cannot be sure they will have any kind of income tomorrow.
再由勞動市場來看。智利的失業率一直盤旋在7%附近，工資上漲率倒仍較通膨率來的高。但糟糕的是就業人口的結構。接近三分之一的勞動力要不是自營商就是地方上的服務業，而這些多是沒有正式合約或福利條件的。而就算是那些有正職工作的人，也大多是簽短期合約。女性與青年的就業率在OECD國家中也是吊車尾。歧視的情況也很嚴重。數十萬持家的女性沒有就業，而上百萬勞工則處在今朝有酒今朝醉，明日的收入還不知在何方的情形下。
The list of reforms that would remedy this situation – such as adaptable work schedules, modernized severance payment schemes, easier part-time work, better job training, and anti-discrimination laws with real teeth – is pretty self-evident. That is what worked in other countries in similar circumstances. But here is the next paradox: as Chile has become more democratic, the same problems that plague advanced democracies have appeared. Politically influential insiders have blocked reforms, while labor-market outsiders are not represented. Few politicians speak for the unemployed young woman with two kids and no high-school diploma, who seldom votes anyway.
有一票改革措施或可改善這些情況 - 諸如彈性工作時間、現代化的資遣費發放規範、更容易的兼職工作、更好的職訓、有真正嚇阻力的反職場歧視法規 - 這些都是明顯有用的工具。這就是其他國家在遇到類似情形時有效的方法。但這裡又有一個弔詭之處，隨著智利的民主化，為禍於先進民主政體的相同問題也隨之出現。具有政治影響力的局內人阻擋改革，而廣大勞動人民則無人為之發聲。其實，不會有任何政客為了失業、帶著兩個小孩、沒有高中文憑還無論如何都鮮有機會去投票的年輕婦女發聲。
Puny pensions also contribute to people’s sense of fragility. Chile’s individual capitalization system earns kudos abroad, but the reality on the ground is more complex. Precisely because the labor market functions badly, Chileans retire with fewer than 20 years of savings, on average, in their accounts. And due to sharply rising longevity (itself a tremendous developmental success), they can expect to live 20 years or more after retirement. Pensions could be adequate only if the rates of return on those savings were huge, but they are getting smaller by the day, in line with falling global real interest rates. Government-funded minimum pensions for people with no savings at all, plus a top-up for those with very low pensions, help alleviate the plight of 1.3 million people at the bottom of the income scale. But now the middle class is feeling the pinch – increasingly so as Chile’s baby-boom generation begins to retire under the private system.
微薄的退休金也讓人們深感不安。智利的勞退機制在國外頗負盛名，然而真實情形頗為複雜。精確說來，由於勞動就業市場機制失靈，智利人平均積累在個人退休金帳戶的年資小於20年。而由於平均壽命的大幅提升（這件事本身真是可喜的成功。），退休後平均倒可以活超過20年。退休金要能夠用只能期待帳戶裡的收益要夠多，然而當今在全球實質利率都持續下探的情形下，收益是每下愈況。由政府出資，給那些完全沒有存入儲金、或是附加給那些儲金非常少的人的基金，可以減緩那130萬低收入者的困境。然而就當智利嬰兒潮世代開始在勞退機制下進入退休年齡，現在是中產階級產生危機意識了。
And while income inequality has not been getting worse, other kinds of inequality may well have become more evident. Chile has joined the OECD club of rich countries, but in many ways it remains a traditional society riven with class privilege. Business leaders and cabinet members tend to come from a handful of private secondary schools in Santiago, especially when right-wing parties are in power, as they are today. The elite often seems to live in a world of its own. Last week, Cecilia Morel, the president’s wife, described the looting as “an alien invasion.”
而收入不平等並未惡化的情形下，其他形式的不平等可能顯得更為刺眼。智利已然是OECD裡面的富裕國家，然而在許多層面上它仍然是一個有許多階級特權的傳統社會。大公司老闆或政治人物仍然來自於聖地牙哥屈指可數的私立中學，特別是右翼政黨當權的時候，就像是現在。菁英階級常常活在自己的天龍國裡。上週，第一夫人賽席利亞莫雷爾，就把劫掠形容為"外星人入侵"。
None of this is new. But it may have become more painfully evident as the country develops. A generation ago, few working-class children attended university. Today, seven of ten students in higher education are the first in their families to attend college. Once they graduate, the frustration begins: to land the best jobs, academic performance matters less than having the “right” surname or connections.
這些都不是新鮮事。然而當國家發展，這可能變得更為令人難以忍受。一個世代以前，少有工薪階級的小孩讀大學。今天，七成高等教育的學生是他們家族中第一個上大學的。一旦他們畢業，馬上就會面臨令人沮喪的事：要得到好的工作，學業表現的良窳與家族地位、人脈比起來簡直毫無用處。
Anger at elites is rampant in Chile, but scorn for the country’s political class is particularly deep. In 2018, 70% of Chileans believed that the country was governed for the benefit a handful of powerful groups. Barely 17% and 14% expressed trust in parliament and in political parties, respectively.
對於菁英階級的憤怒在智利已開始蔓延，但對於這個國家的從政者的鄙視尤深。在2018年，70%的智利人相信國家掌控者只把利益輸送給少數特權階級。分別只有17%與14%的人對國會與政黨表示信任。
This is relatively new. High regard for civilian politicians during the transition to democracy nearly three decades ago gave way to a growing perception of insularity, and then a wave of campaign finance scandals. Today, the absence of term limits and parliamentarians’ outsize compensation (among the highest in Latin America) are huge magnets for public anger.
而這是相對新的情況。在將近30年間的民主轉型期高度重視平民政治的結果導致心態短視、格局不足，而後又有一波選舉金流的醜聞。今日，缺乏任期限制與國會議員的超額津貼（在拉美堪稱最高）更是令大眾憤怒。
Lack of trust in politicians weakens people’s hopes for the future. And Chile’s recent economic deceleration, standing as it does in sharp contrast to Piñera’s ringing promises of economic growth, has exacerbated the problem. Perhaps it was these dashed hopes that brought the many tensions and contradictions in Chile to a boil.
缺乏對政治人物的信任弱化了人民對未來的希望。而智利最近的經濟發展的減速，與總統言猶在耳的經濟發展承諾成了鮮明的對比，更加劇了不信任的問題。在智利，或許就是這些破滅的希望讓許多緊張與矛盾一舉掀開壓力鍋。
There is now a unique opportunity to rewrite the social contract and deal decisively with the sources of citizen anger. But the risks are many. One is that voters will conclude that Chile’s gains were all more illusory than real, and will therefore throw the baby out with the bathwater. Another is that the current climate of fear and division will bring a populist to power, as has happened in Mexico, Brazil, and now Argentina.
現在是重新訂定社會契約與決定性的處理民怨根因的唯一機會。然而現況危機四伏。首先是選民會得出智利得到的都不過是虛假幻影的結論，然後不惜玉石俱焚。另一是現在的風向與四分五裂的民意容易將民粹領導者拱上台，就像之前的墨西哥、巴西，以及現在的阿根廷。
In Chile, polls already show gains for populists of the extreme right and left. If that trend continues, the country’s turmoil could be far from over.
在智利，民調已顯示位於左右極端光譜者大有斬獲。如果此趨勢繼續，這個國家的混亂恐將永無寧日。
註釋：
by all accounts: 據說
untold: 多不勝數
fed up: 受夠了
unabashed apologist: 不在意批評、執意推動特定政策或理念的人
for starters: 首先
severance payment: 資遣費
puny pension: 微薄的退休金
kudo: 聲譽
individual capitalization system: 個人退休金帳戶。
dashed hope: 破滅的希望
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