內坦雅胡的遺緒貽害不淺
After 12 years with Binyamin Netanyahu in power, Israel is more divided than it has ever been, and Israelis have largely lost hope that their country can be both Jewish and democratic. Can the new government, united only by its aversion to the country's longest-serving prime minister, push back against this legacy?
來源：Shlomo Ben-Ami, Project Syndicate, 09 JUN 2021, 來源網址
Soon, Binyamin Netanyahu will no longer be Israel’s prime minister. After 12 years in power, what kind of country will he leave behind?
很快的，內坦雅胡將會卸任以色列首相。在他12年的掌權之後，擺脫他的以色列變成了一個什麼樣的國家？
Netanyahu was not always the irremediable hawk that his opponents (especially outside Israel) thought him to be. He often displayed a sharp pragmatism, reflecting a keen intelligence, extensive historical knowledge, impressive economic proficiency, and a deep awareness of regional and global trends.
內坦雅胡並不總是如他的反對者（特別是在以色列境外）所想的，是那麼無可救藥的鷹派。他常會表現出敏銳的務實派形象、機智、廣泛的歷史背景知識、令人印象深刻的經濟能力，與對於區域與全球趨勢的深刻洞察力。
But remaining in power was paramount for Netanyahu, so he tended to focus more on appeasing his base than serving the national interest. That often – and increasingly – meant pitting groups against one another by appealing to people’s tribal instincts. He ruled by incitement, implementing policies that matched his ultra-nationalistic, anti-Arab rhetoric.
但對內坦雅胡而言掌權莫過於一切，所以他對於討好其死忠支持者更勝於國家利益。這常常 – 且越來越 – 意味著以挑動族群神經的方式驅使不同族群相互對抗。他以煽動、制定符合他極端民族主義與反阿拉伯言論的政策統治國家。
For example, Netanyahu backed the 2018 nation-state law, which effectively establishes Israeli Arabs as second-class citizens. And he embraced the goal of annexation of Palestinian lands – an issue over which Israeli right-wing coalitions have historically wavered – effectively taking extreme religious Zionism mainstream.
例如內坦雅胡2018年推動的民族國家法案，該法案有效的將阿拉伯裔以色列人確立為二等公民。他也支持兼併巴勒斯坦佔領區的目標 – 這個問題以色列右翼聯盟歷史上曾有所動搖 - 這有效的讓他將極端猶太復國主義收編旗下。
Netanyahu’s successive governments have worked tirelessly to create the conditions for annexation of the occupied West Bank. At times, he seemed to prioritize the fantasy of Judea and Samaria shared by much of his base above Israel itself, pouring billions of dollars into realizing it.
內坦雅胡政權一直以來不辭勞苦的為兼併約旦河西岸此事建立有利條件。有時他似乎優先考慮死忠支持者所共有的吃下猶大-撒馬利亞區的幻想更甚於以色列本身，為將此實現不惜豪擲數十億元。
And yet, there were times when Netanyahu was not quite the energetic builder of Jewish settlements in the West Bank that his constituency wanted him to be. In 2009, he declared a ten-month freeze on new settlements that then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called “unprecedented” (though no restrictions were placed on the thousands of buildings already under construction to expand existing settlements).
然而之前有時內坦雅胡也看來並不是如他的選民所希望那麼熱衷於在約旦河西岸建立猶太屯墾區。在2009年，他宣布對新屯墾區的建設凍結10個月，當時的美國國務卿希拉蕊稱此為"史無前例的"（即使對於現有屯墾區內已經建造中的數千棟建築毫無施加任何限制。）
In 2014, Netanyahu negotiated a peace framework with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, in which he adopted some unexpectedly reasonable positions. That said, to keep his right-wing base happy, he refused to restrain construction by Jewish settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, even during the negotiations.
在2014年，內坦雅胡與巴勒斯坦總統阿巴斯協調出了一個和平架構，在架構內他的立場卻出乎意料的理性。儘管如此，就算在協調期間，他也拒絕去限制猶太屯墾者在約旦河西岸與東耶路薩冷的建設。
A similar logic lay behind Netanyahu’s exorbitant concessions to Israel’s Orthodox community, reversing his own previous efforts made as finance minister in the early 2000s to cut their parasitic dependence on state allowances. By contrast, he invested far less in improving the conditions in Israel’s poorer periphery; he trusted that his unrelenting attacks on the old liberal “elites” would be enough to maintain the support of voters there.
內坦雅胡對以色列猶太正統派社群的過份讓步也是基於相似的邏輯，他原先在2000年代初期就任財政部長時致力於斬斷這些團體對於國家補助的依賴，後來也被他自己翻盤。相形之下，他對改善以色列邊鄉窮困的生活條件所投資的就少得可憐。他相信他對老自由派菁英不屈不撓的攻擊就已足夠穩固鄉村選民的支持。
Netanyahu’s history of coalition-building reflects a similar focus on self-preservation. In the past, he has formed governing coalitions with left-leaning and centrist parties. After the last four legislative elections, however, he did not hesitate to govern with Jewish-supremacist factions.
內坦雅胡歷來對於執政聯盟的建立也反映出了這種自保的態度。在過去，他曾建立過包含左翼與中間人士的執政聯盟。但在最近四次大選，他毫無遲疑的選擇以猶太至上主義者進行治理。
This is not some reflection of a genuine ideological shift. If it was, Netanyahu would not have been willing to strike a coalition deal with Ra’am, an Islamist Party linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, this past March. This is, after all, the same man who warned in 2015 that Israeli Arabs were heading to the polling stations in droves, in order to give his party a boost in a tight race.
這並非反映其真正的意識形態轉變。如果是的話，今年三月內坦雅胡是不會願意與像拉阿姆這種與穆斯林兄弟會有所牽扯的政黨達成執政聯盟協議的。畢竟，2015年就是同一個人警告阿裔以色列選民最好是集體前去投開票所喔，而只是為了給他的政黨在激烈拉鋸戰中一劑強心針。
Netanyahu will go down in Israeli history as the politician who legitimized the participation of Arab parties in government. Anything to stay in power. This particular thing, however, may well have been Netanyahu’s undoing: the coalition that his political opponents have formed would not have been large enough to unseat him without Ra’am.
內坦雅胡將會以合法化阿拉伯政黨的參政的政治家身分載入以色列史冊。他任何事都是為了權力。但這件特別的事可能是內坦雅胡的敗因：要是沒有拉阿姆黨的加入的話，內坦雅胡的反對派根本不足以組成夠大的執政聯盟把內坦雅胡拉下馬來。
That is not the only reason the new coalition could not exist without Netanyahu. Its eight ideologically diverse parties – including leftists, centrists, right-wing nationalists, and Arab Islamists – are united by one thing: the desire to unseat him. Many are former Netanyahu allies, who were increasingly alienated by his narcissistic, overbearing, and often shameful behavior. For them, his indictment on three charges of corruption and breach of trust was the last straw.
這並不是新的執政聯盟一旦失去內坦雅胡這個目標就會土崩瓦解的唯一理由。聯盟內的八個意識形態彼此各異的政黨 – 包含左翼、中間派、右翼民族主義份子與阿拉伯穆斯林全部只因要把他拉下來才團結一致的。其中許多人都曾是他的盟友，而因他的自戀、自以為是、甚至常常是可恥的行為才漸行漸遠。對他們而言，內坦雅胡的三項貪汙與背信罪名被起訴是壓垮駱駝的最後一根稻草。
Netanyahu’s penchant for bridge-burning can also be seen in Israel’s deteriorating image in the United States, especially among moderates and liberals, including most US Jews. By aligning himself closely with the Republican Party and former President Donald Trump, he turned support for Israel into a hyper-partisan affair.
內坦雅胡老愛不留退路的作風也可以由以色列在美國的形象日漸敗壞中一見端倪，特別是溫和派與自由派，包含大多數在美國的猶太人。藉由緊密的與共和黨與前總統川普靠攏，他把爭取美國對以色列的支持完全押寶在一個黨派。
The recent escalation of violence with the Palestinians seems to have further estranged many Americans. More fundamentally, it was a wake-up call for Netanyahu, who believed he had all but defeated the cause of Palestinian nationalism. This belief was fortified by the recent signing of the Abraham Accords, establishing diplomatic relations between Israel and four Arab states.
近期與巴勒斯坦間的越演越烈的暴力衝突似乎讓更多美國人對以色列離心離德。更重要的是，這對內坦雅胡是一記警鐘，他深信他幾乎徹底打垮了巴勒斯坦民族主義的大業。最近簽署的亞伯拉罕協議更加深了此信念，此協議讓以色列與四個阿拉伯國家建立了正常外交關係。
Netanyahu knew how to leverage regional changes to Israel’s benefit. He saw that the Middle East’s incumbent Sunni regimes feared popular uprisings akin to the 2011 Arab Spring, as well as the rise of a nuclear (Shia) Iran. This, together with the recognition that the US is losing interest in the region, created a golden opportunity for Israel to normalize relations with them – ostensibly weakening the Palestinians’ diplomatic support significantly.
內坦雅胡深知如何利用區域形勢的演變使以色列獲利。他看到中東這些當今的遜尼派政權都在擔心像是2011年的阿拉伯之春的民眾起義在自己國家發生，擔心程度與出現一個擁核的什葉派伊朗簡直有過之而無不及。再加上認知到美國對此區域已逐漸失去興趣，這給了以色列一個千載難逢的良機與這些阿拉伯國家建立正常化外交關係。而此表面上嚴重的弱化了巴勒斯坦所獲得的外交支持。
And yet, as the recent violence shows, Israel’s Palestinian problem is as acute as ever, and Jerusalem remains a flashpoint that could well trigger a religious war in the Middle East. Netanyahu’s counterproductive fight against the 2015 Iran nuclear deal and his consequent failure to stem Iran’s nuclear ambitions and regional designs only exacerbate the risk of a regional flare-up.
但是最近的暴力事件顯示，以色列的巴勒斯坦問題激烈程度更甚於以往，而在中東地區耶路撒冷仍然會是一個可能觸發宗教戰爭的驚爆點。內坦雅胡在2015年適得其反的反對伊朗的核協議，接著又無力阻止伊朗的核野心與中東區域內的各項爭奪，在在都只會惡化區域戰火爆發的風險。
Beyond the Abraham Accords, Netanyahu oversaw two other major strategic developments. First, building on Israel’s new status as a gas-producing power in the Eastern Mediterranean, he established a tripartite strategic alliance with Greece and Cyprus, as a counterweight to Turkey’s destabilizing aspirations. Second, he expanded Israel’s economic links with China, Japan, and India.
除了亞伯拉罕協議外，內坦雅胡還督導了兩項重大的戰略發展。首先，他將以色列打造為地中海東岸的油氣生產強權，並與希臘、塞浦路斯建立三方戰略同盟，藉以抗衡土耳其搞破壞的願望。第二，他還拓展了與中國、日本與印度的經貿連結。
Yet Netanyahu’s economic legacy also leaves much to be desired. Under his strict neoliberal policies, the welfare system was hit hard, and Israel consolidated its position as one of the OECD’s most unequal countries, with 21% of the population living below the poverty line.
但內坦雅胡遺下的經濟也還有很多不足。在他嚴厲的新自由化經濟政策下，國家福利系統遭受嚴重打擊，而且在經合組織成員中以色列竟一直是最不平等的國家之一，有21%的人口生活在貧窮線下。
Ultimately, Netanyahu’s legacy is one of tension, loathing, and chaos. Israel is now more divided than it has ever been, and Israelis have largely lost hope that their country can be both Jewish and democratic. Can a government united only by its aversion to Netanyahu push back against this legacy?
最後，內坦雅胡所遺下的要不是緊張局勢、那就是嫌惡或混亂。以色列變得前所未有的四分五裂，而以色列人大多對國家能同時朝猶太化與民主化前進失去希望。而新政府能僅因為對他的反感團結在一起，最終推翻他的遺緒嗎？
註釋：
irremediable: 無可救藥的
pit A against B: 促使一個人、群體對抗或與另一人、群體競爭。
incitement: 煽動
nation-state: 民族國家
at times: 有時
Judea and Samaria: 猶大-撒馬利亞區，以色列管轄的約旦河西岸區域。
that said: 儘管如此
exorbitant: 昂貴、過度的
concession: 讓步
by contrast: 相形之下
unrelenting: 不屈不撓的
Ra'am: 拉阿姆，以色列的阿拉伯裔政黨，爭取阿裔以色列人的權益
alienate: 疏遠
narcissistic: 自戀的
overbearing: 自以為是
penchant: 偏好、癖好
estranged: 疏遠、失和的
akin: 類似的
ostensibly: 表面上的
counterproductive: 適得其反
aspiration: 抱負
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